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Objectives. To examine the decision-making of Alzheimer’s patients in a simple, classic game 
focusing on their capabilities to implement social norms and common social preferences. 
 
Methods. Patients with stage-I (very mild and mild) Alzheimer’s disease were asked to 
participate in a Dictator Game, a type of game in which a subject has to decide how to allocate a 
certain amount of money between himself and another person.  
 
Results. When we compared the results of treatments involving Alzheimer’s disease patients (at 
an early stage) with those of identical treatments involving patients with mild cognitive 
impairment or healthy elderly controls, with similar ages and social backgrounds, we did not find 
statistically significant differences.  
 
Discussion. This finding suggests that stage-I Alzheimer’s disease patients are as capable of 
making decisions involving basic social norms and preferences as other individuals of their age. 
Whatever brain structures are affected by the disease, they do not appear to influence, at this 
early stage, the neural basis for cooperation-enhancing social interactions.  
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Alzheimer's disease (AD) is a neurodegenerative disorder that afflicts a growing part of our 
aging population. Progression from healthy aging to Alzheimer's dementia occurs in a subtle and 
graded fashion over perhaps a decade or longer. Consequently, individuals in the prodromal 
stage may often be inadvertently included in samples of apparently normal elderly subjects 
(Heden & Gabrieli, 2004). However, behavioral measures of cognitive impairment can be used 
to evaluate progression from healthy aging to mild cognitive impairment (MCI) to Alzheimer's 
disease, such that individuals with MCI can be selectively excluded based on their performance. 
MCI refers to an early, but abnormal, state of cognitive impairment (Artero, Petersen, Touchon, 
& Ritchie, 2006; Petersen, 2004). Phenomenologically, it is a transitional stage between normal 
aging and dementia in which patients complain about poor memory task performance, but do not 
meet the diagnostic criteria for Alzheimer's disease (Bondi, Jak, Delano-Wood, Jacobson, Delis 
& Salmon, 2008; Nelson & O’Connor, 2008). In a sample of normal older adults, some 3–5% 
will develop MCI each year. There is increasing evidence that individuals with MCI have a 
greatly increased likelihood of progression to Alzheimer's disease, with an annual rate of 
progression of 10–15% (Heiden & Gabrieli, 2004).  Nevertheless, MCI cannot be considered an 
early stage of AD. 
Much progress has been made in characterizing the behavioral and neural changes, 
particularly in memory systems that are associated with advancing age. The diagnosis of AD is 
mainly based on standardized neuropsychological tests that explore the preservation of higher 
functions. In particular, attention is given to the evaluation of consciousness, language, 
visuospatial function, memory, orientation, cognitive function, and thought. When properly 
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applied, neuropsychological investigation provides a correct diagnosis in more than 80% of 
patients, as judged against necropsy findings. Neuroimaging is increasingly being used, and can 
provide correct diagnoses in as many as 92–94% (Norberg, 2001). 
  Since Alzheimer’s disease is a process that starts with mild cognitive impairments that 
are difficult to diagnose, and progresses towards a broad generalized state in which it becomes 
hard to separate primary signs from secondary non-specific consequences, the early 
manifestations of AD provide a useful model for analyzing the selective weakening of higher 
functions. These early manifestations occur roughly during stage I (i.e., in the first 1–3 years) of 
the disease (Hughes, Berg, & Danzinger, 1982; Reisberg, Ferris, & DeLeon, 1982), when 
learning deficits predominate and before other symptoms start to impair the patient’s 
independence. In fact, it seems that the earliest neuropsychological deficits in AD are in short-
term memory and in declarative episodic long-term memory (Petersen, Smith, & Waring, 1999). 
These deficits form the background to the typical anterograde amnesia distinctive of early AD, 
which is characterized by clear limitations on the ability to learn new information while the 
capability of evoking old memories is retained. 
  Although early AD and MCI patients share similar memory deficits, they are classified 
separately because additional cognitive functions and functional performance are impaired in 
AD. It is possible, then, to distinguish three groups of subjects, AD, MCI and healthy elderly 
controls (HEC), who may be expected to behave differently to the extent that their decision-
making relies on mental structures that may be influenced in unique ways by the two conditions. 
  The importance of capacity assessment in older adults cannot be denied (Moye & 
Marson, 2007). In the human society, cooperation-enhancing social sentiments, like altruism, 
fairness or reciprocity, are central to many aspects of decision-making. In the paper, we explore 
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experimentally whether AD patients in the first stage of their disease experience “social 
memory” loss, which is the loss of capabilities that help regulate social interactions, such as the 
ability to show fairness and altruism, and the capacity to value one’s social standing, i.e., one’s 
reputation. These findings could help link degeneration in specific brain structures in AD 
patients with structures that are engaged in cooperative social interactions, that is the neural 
correlates of such cooperation-enhancing social norms as a sense of fairness, altruism and 
reciprocity. In this way, our observations could add to our understanding of the neural basis of 
one distinguishing feature of the human species, namely cooperative collective action. 
  To test the degree of “social memory” loss, we invited stage-I AD, MCI and HEC  
individuals to participate in a Dictator Game, DG (see  Camerer, 2003, for references for this 
type of game). In this social game, one player, called the dictator, receives a specified amount of 
money from the experimenter, and has to decide how much of this money goes to another player 
(typically an unknown person). The other player, called the receiver, can only accept the money. 
This game involves the simplest form of decision-making in two-person bargaining, since no 
strategic consideration of the receiver’s reaction to the offer should influence the dictator’s 
decision. It is simple to understand and play, which makes it well suited to test subjects with 
cognitive impairments. It is also well documented. Thus, this game can provide useful tools for 
evaluating “self-interest” or “other-regarding” behavior in AD patients. Self-interest is key to 
explaining individual decision-making in economics. From this perspective, the dictator in a 
Dictator Game should give nothing to the other person. However, other-regarding behavior, 
which may itself evolve from maximizing behavior, must be invoked to explain human 
cooperation and the evolution of social norms that enhance cooperation. Other-regarding 
behavior may take different forms in different models, be it fairness (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), 
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altruism (Andreoni, 1989), indirect reciprocity (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004), or reputation 
building (Fehr, 2004), to name a few. The DG, being devoid of any strategic element with 
respect to the other player, the receiver, who in fact plays no active role in the game, illustrates 
that the decision to give a non-zero amount is other-regarding or driven by cooperation-
enhancing social norms and preferences (see Camerer, 2003, for references on social norms and 
preferences). Consequently, by comparing the amount given by stage-I AD patients with that 
given by MCI patients and healthy elderly controls, we can approach the degree to which 
patients with stage-I AD continue to apply these social norms and social preferences. 
 
Methods 
The subjects in our DG experiment were randomly selected from the patient pool of the Hospital 
San Vicente in Alicante, Spain, and recruited by telephone by the staff of the Alzheimer’s Centre 
at the Hospital. They were asked to participate in a session in which they would perform “some 
mental exercises”. They were also informed of the estimated duration of the exercises and told 
that no physical examination or medical procedure would be carried out. There was no indication 
of any reward.  
As mentioned above, subjects were classified in one of three groups depending on 
whether they had been diagnosed with AD or MCI, or had no diagnosed cognitive impairment. 
The diagnoses had previously been made by a highly experienced team (neurologist-
neuropsychologist) following the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative 
Disorders and Stroke (NINCDS) and Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Association 
(ADRDA; McKhann, Drachmn, Folstein, Katzman, Price & Stadlan, 1984) criteria. The 
candidates had to complete the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein) and the 
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Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale (ADAS, Mosh). Criteria for allocating the MCI pool 
followed Petersen et al. (1999) guidelines restricting the sample to amnestic MCI (aMCI) single 
domain type (Artero et al., 2006). Inclusion in the MCI group required MMSE score equal or 
greater than 24 and ADAS score equal or smaller than 10, and not meeting DSM-IV-TR 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition) dementia criteria. 
Inclusion in the AD group was based on the DSM-IV-TR and NINCDS-ADRDA criteria. The 
criteria established by NINCDS-ADRDA for labeling a patient as AD consist in finding at least 
one more impaired function (in addition to memory) among the so-called cognitive functions 
(aphasia, apraxia, agnosia, and executive functions). When only one of these functions is 
affected, the patient is classified as mild or Stage I. 
Patients with other neurological, metabolic and psychiatric pathologies were excluded. 
All the patients recruited as AD and MCI received a complete neurological and 
europsychological evaluation at the time of the study.   n
 
In detail, the three groups of subjects were: 
•  AD group: hospital outpatients who had been diagnosed in the previous six months, and 
who were in the initial stage (stage I: very mild and mild stage) of the disease  (Hughes 
et al., 1982; Reisberg et al., 1982); 
•  MCI group: outpatients who had also been diagnosed in the previous six months; and 
•  HEC group: invited subjects without mental impairments. The subjects in this group had 
a similar age and social background as members of the other two groups. This group 
comprised two types of subject: first, members of the patients’ family and, second, 
volunteers from a State center for old people. 




  Subjects were overwhelmingly working class and had completed only a few years of 
schooling. Table 1 summarizes the sample. More details are provided in Appendix 2. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Groups of two to eight participants were taken to the experimental room, which was located in 
the hospital grounds. In each treatment, they were seated behind cardboard screens to protect 
their privacy, provided with an envelope, and given a present of ten €1 coins. In the double-blind 
version of the Dictator Game run in the US, in which participants are anonymous to other 
participants as well as to the experimenter, dollar bills are used (Eckel & Grossman, 1996; 
Hoffmann, McCabe & Smith, 1996)). Unfortunately, there are no paper €1 bills, which would 
have been much easier to conceal in an envelope. Bohnet  and Frey (1995) also used coins in 
their experiments. 
 Instructions were read aloud. These described the receiver and asked participants to 
place any coins they wanted to allocate to the receiver inside the envelope, while keeping their 
share in their pocket or purse. At the end of each treatment, an experimenter collected the 
envelopes. Importantly, the word dictator was never mentioned. 
Subjects were told that their names would not be revealed. However, in order to avoid a 
degree of complexity that might not have been easily handled by AD subjects, we decided 
against using a full-anonymity procedure, such as Hoffman et al. (1996) double-anonymous 
procedure, or any other complex procedure.  
 
  We implemented three sequential treatments: 
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  The anonymous treatment: the receiver was described as an anonymous person “like 
yourselves” who was located in another room in the building; 
  The two-way identification treatment: to each dictator corresponded a receiver, who was 
of the same sex and of a similar age, who entered the room where the experiment was 
taking place and was personally introduced to the dictator as the person who would 
receive whatever money he/she allocated to the receiver. The intention of visual 
recognition was to turn the faceless receiver into full-fledged human being; 
  The Red Cross treatment: the receiver was identified as the Red Cross (see Eckel & 
Grossman, 1996, for a description of a Dictator Game with a Red Cross receiver). 
 
  Each subject participated in all three treatments. The anonymous treatment took place 
first. Once it was over, instructions for the two-way identification treatment were read out, the 
receivers were asked to enter the room and were introduced to the dictators without names being 
mentioned. Thereafter, the receivers were escorted out of the room and the dictators made their 
decisions. Finally, instructions for the Red Cross treatment were read out and, after the envelopes 
for this last treatment were collected, the participants were dismissed. We did not test for order 
effects because our interest was in comparing differences among groups. 
 
Results 
As shown in the three graphs in Figure 1, our data indicate: 
 
Observation 1: the amounts given by the control, MCI and AD groups were indistinguishable in 
each of the three treatments (see Figures 1a–1c). 
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No conventional statistical test (e.g., all three Kruskal Wallis tests for the between group 
comparison for each treatment show p-values above 0.23) could reject the null hypothesis that 
the three different groups behaved identically in each treatment. 
 
Observation 2: visual contact with the receiver in the two-way identification treatment did not 
change the pattern of giving observed in the anonymous treatment in any of the three groups. 
 
To our subjects, it appeared that a stranger was a stranger whether or not he or she was 
seen (e.g. Wilcoxon test, p = 0.9). This may indicate that, like healthy participants, stage-I AD 
patients can form abstract images of other individuals and can relate to them as they do with 
visually observed individuals.  
 
Observation 3: a significant increase in giving occurred in all three groups when the receiver 
was the Red Cross. 
 
The amount given to the Red Cross was found to be significantly greater (at p < 0.0001 level, 
using the Wilcoxon test for both pairwise comparison of anonymous and two-way identification, 
respectively, with Red Cross). In particular, when the results of the two-way identification 
treatment are compared with those of the Red Cross treatment, it can be seen that 48% of 
subjects in the AD group, 58% in the MCI, and 44% in the HEC increased the amount they gave. 
The more generous allocations to the Red Cross seem to indicate that all three groups were 
equally aware of the social context. In particular, the change in AD subjects’ behavior that 
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occurred when moving from the first two treatments to the Red-Cross treatment was 
indistinguishable from the change that occurred in both MCI patients and HEC.  
 In summary, the decisions made by AD patients were indistinguishable from those made 
by MCI patients and healthy elderly participants. 
[Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c about here] 
 
Discussion 
It is well known that DG results are quite sensitive to design details. In our study, see Tables 2 
and 3, subjects gave on average more than in most previously reported DG experiments (e.g., 
Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Frey & Bohnet, 1995).  
[Table 2 and Table 3 about here] 
 
Subjects in most DG experiments are undergraduate students, with ages around 20, but in 
our experiment the average age is above 70. While it has been observed that “older adults” 
decision behavior is similar to that of young adults, Bellemare and Kroeger (2003),  Berg, 
Dickhaut & McCabe (1995),  Fehr, Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, Schupp & Wagner,(2003),  
Kovalchik, Camerer, Grether, Plott & Allman, (2004) and Sutter and Kocher (2004) found that 
the degree of reciprocity, as indicated by the returns in trust games, becomes significantly higher 
as age increases. Age, therefore, could explain the more generous amounts of giving in our 
experiment compared to previous ones with students.  
In addition, in most DG experiments subjects are recruited inside campuses with the 
promise of earning money when volunteering in an experiment. But, as Eckel and Grossman 
(2000) reported, subjects who are, instead, “corralled” for participation can behave very 
Prosocial capabilities in AD  patients 
 12 
 
differently. They compared the results obtained in DG experiments using student volunteers with 
those with pseudovolunteers. Pseudovolunteers were recruited in class to participate in an 
experiment during class time.  In the latter group, 28.7% gave everything to charity and 
contributions were 22–50% higher than in the volunteers group, where only 5.2% gave 
everything.  It appears that subjects in the pseudovolunteers group were motivated by 
“something other than the incentive structure built into the experimental design”, which is 
another way of saying that self-interest did not drive their decisions. Since the participants in our 
experiment were more like pseudovolunteers than genuine volunteers, Eckel and Grossman’s 
observations could explain some of the differences. 
Finally, one should not disregard the effect of the participant’s surprise that a procedure 
carried out in a hospital should result in money being earned. In fact, a number of subjects in all 
three groups stated that they had no entitlement to the experimental money, that they had not 
earned it, and, therefore, that they did not deserve to take it with them. They felt they could not 
possibly justify accepting money as “manna from the experimental heaven” to their husband or 
wife. 
It should also be noted that, in our study, there was no difference between the results of the 
anonymous treatment and those of the two-way identification treatment. This contrasts with Frey 
and Bohnet’s results (1995) which found that the amount given increased significantly from one 
treatment to the other (see Table 3, equal divisions increased from 25% to 71%). However, Frey 
and Bohnet used a between-group experimental design, whereas we used a within-group design, 
thereby promoting, perhaps, a higher correlation in giving behavior among treatments. But, most 
important, our subjects, as discussed above, already gave half or more in the anonymous 
treatment, which was very generous and could hardly be improved. 
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  In any case, the important point is that, whatever factors drove the participants’ 
generosity, they did not influence the three subject groups differently. Recall that since the three 
groups were recruited in an identical way for the same experiments in the same hospital 
environment, and had similar social backgrounds and ages, they only significantly differed in 
their cognitive abilities, according to the clinical tests. But the differential impairments in their 
cognitive skills had no effect on the amounts that they decided to share.  
While descriptions comparing AD with normal elderly subjects indicate basic problem-
solving disorders (see, e.g., Torralva, Dorrego, Sabe, Chemerinski & Starkstein, 2000; Lai & 
Karlawish, 2007; Martini & Domahs, 2003), it is well-known that AD patients are, nonetheless, 
capable of solving well-structured problems (Passini, Rainville, Marchand & Joanette,1995). 
Kim, Karlawish & Caine(2002) reviewed the relevant literature identifying thirty-two studies, 
which reached very heterogeneous conclusions. They concluded that research into the decision-
making competence of cognitively impaired elderly persons is a growing field that is just 
beginning to yield findings with practical implications for preserving the autonomy and welfare 
of this group of vulnerable elderly patients.  
It is well established that AD patients suffer from a semantic memory impairment (Daum, 
Riesch, Sartori & Birbaumer, 1996; Giffard, Desgranges, Nore-May, Lalevée, Beaunieux, de la 
Sayette, Pasquier & Eustache, 2002;  Tippett, Gendall, Farah & Thompson-Schill, 2004), 
reduced executive control function (Voss & Bullock, 2004), as well as loss of task, and loss of 
detachment (Marson, Amis, McInturff, Bartolucci & Harrell,1999). Even in the early stages, AD 
patients have problems in updating the contents of their working memory and suppressing 
activation of no-longer-relevant information (Sebastian, Menor & Elosua,2006), and have 
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difficulties in handling decisions under risk or ambiguity (Delazer, Sinz, Zamarian & 
Benke,2007, Sinz, Zamarian, Benke, Wenning & Delazer, 2008). 
But cognitive process amounts to much more than these functions, and other domains 
appear to remain conserved. While there is a differential impairment of recall memory, the 
personality, values, and substantial long-term memory remain preserved, as does implicit 
memory for recent events (Sabat, 2005). Similarly, AD conserve the capacity for acquiring and 
maintaining implicit affective dispositions even when explicit memory is impaired (Blessing, 
Keil, Linden, Heim & Ray,2006), and, at least in mild AD, one component of metamemorial 
ability (Waring, Chong, Wolk & Budson2008). These features probably underlie the observation 
of the retained ability to vote in patients with very mild to mild AD (Appelbaum, Bonnie & 
Karlawish, 2005; Irastorza, Corujo & Banuelos,2007). 
That some cognitive components are preserved was described early (Nebes and Brady, 
1990), and our results suggest that in early stages of the disease, the functioning of the neural 
circuitry responsible for the prosocial capabilities tested in the experiment appears to remain 
sufficiently well preserved and that the operational subset of this circuitry seems still capable of 
maintaining a large degree of normal social behavior. This is consistent with the observation that 
a broad range of complex cognitive abilities is preserved in patients with dementia of the 
Alzheimer type who cannot perform simple actions (see Beatty, Winn, Adams, Allen, Wilson, 
Prince, Olson, Dean & Littleford, 1994; Goldberg, 2005; Gregory, Lough, Stone, Erzinclioglu, 
Martin, Baron-Cohen & Hodges, 2002), and in agreement with our present understanding of AD, 
which generally accepts that lesions begin to appear in the temporal region, mainly in the 
hippocampus (Nordberg, 2001). In contrast, the structures involved in decision-making are 
mainly located in the prefrontal cortex, which is affected in more advanced stages of the disease 
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but which remains apparently unaffected early on. Changes in the performance of decision-
making tasks would be expected in subjects with frontal pathologies (e.g., frontotemporal 
dementia or orbitofrontal lesions). In fact, some studies have shown that patients with 
orbitofrontal cortical lesions are unable to anticipate the negative consequences of their choices 
(Camille, Coricelli, Sallet, Pradat-Diehl, Duhamel & Sirigu, 2004; Reisberg et al., 1982). Stage-I 
AD patients do not usually show the loss of basic emotions and insight, the selfishness or the loss 
of interest that characterize other dementias, like frontotemporal dementia or cerebrovascular 
dementia (Bathgate, Snowden, Varma, Blackshaw & Neary2001; Boller, El Massioui, Devouche, 
Traykov, Pomati & Starkstein, 2002; Bucks & Radford, 2004). Clearly, a study of how patients 
with frontotemporal dementia perform in the DG would provide results that would complement 
our findings. However, our results appear to indicate that decision-making in the DG is 
performed without the involvement of short-term memory, clearly impaired in our AD patients. 
  
Conclusions 
This study did not demonstrate a statistically significant difference in the way stage-I AD 
patients, MCI patients and HEC perform in the DG, a game that involves the simplest form of 
decision making in two-person bargaining. Moreover, like the MCI patients and the healthy 
elderly participants, AD subjects gave more generously as the receiver changed from being an 
anonymous or visually-observed individual to a well-known charity. 
This experiment enables us to conclude that the memory deficit characteristic of stage-I 
AD patients appears not to affect their performances when deciding how generous they should be 
to a third party. Paraphrasing Hoffman et al. (1996, p. 655), we can say that, if it is past 
experiences that drive participants’ decisions, then stage-I AD patients have not lost their 
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memories of these experiences. If, on the other hand, it is the prospect of the future consequences 
of their decisions that shape them, then stage-I AD patients have not lost their concern for how 
their decisions will be judged. Like healthy subjects, AD patients bring their experiences and 
their reputation from the outside world into the experimental environment. This is consistent 
with healthy elderly patients. 
To conclude, stage-I AD patients appear to be as capable of making decisions involving 
the prosocial norms and prosocial preferences that regulate altruism, fairness or reputation as any 
person of their age. Whatever brain structures are affected by the disease, it appears not to 
impinge seriouslyon the neural basis for cooperation-enhancing social sentiments at the early 
stages. 
Although submitting AD patients to a decision-making task in social games is not easy, 
due to their cognitive impairments, our research suggests two fruitful lines of research. One, 
involving patients with more advanced AD in a DG game, in order to establish the degree of 
fading of social memories as the disease progresses. Secondly, relying on different social games, 
to further study the strategic behavior of Stage-I AD patients in social interactions: In particular, 
using public good games (Kagel & Roth, 1995) to check for selfish or cooperative behavior, and 
trust games (Camerer, 2003) to check for trust or trustworthiness. As these games can be 
designed to involve AD patients in repeated social interactions, they should allow for a more 
subtle understanding of how AD patients react when confronted with a variety of contributions 
from other players.  
  It is worth acknowledging the limitations that a poor understanding of the early dementia 
manifestations imposes on our study. Subtle deficits, that may elude detection, could be 
significant for the differential diagnoses with MCI (Nelson & O'Connor, 2008), although the 
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similar behavior of MCI and AD observed in our experiment suggests that better diagnostic tools 
will not affect our results. In fact, properly designed social games could be added to the new 
battery of tests proposed by Dubois, Feldman, Jacova, Dekosky, Barberger-Gateau, Cummings, 
Delacourte, Galasko, Gauthier, Jicha, Meguro, O'brien, Pasquier, Robert, Rossor, Salloway, 
Stern, Visser, Scheltens (2007)  (incorporating the use of biomarkers through structural MRI, 
molecular neuroimaging with PET, and cerebrospinal ﬂuid analyses) and, thereby, homing in on 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Three Subject Groups, Patients with Alzheimer 
(AD), Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), and Healthy Elderly Controls 
(HEC) 
Subject group  Number  Males  Average age 
(standard deviation) 
AD 23  14  75.7  (5.7) 
MCI 15  6  73.6  (6.4) 
HEC 25 
 
15 70.6  (6.7) 
 




Table 2. Average Amounts Given Out of 10 Euros (Standard Deviation in 
Parenthesis) by the Different Subject Groups (Patients with Alzheimer (AD), 
Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), Healthy Elderly Controls (HEC)) in the 
Three Treatments (Anonymous, Two-way and Red Cross.) 
  Anonymous receiver   Two-way 
identification 
Red Cross 
AD       €6.52  (€6.17)       €6.69 (€7.04)     €8.04 (€5.5) 
MCI       €6.59 (€5.92)       €6.42 (€5.37)     €8.52 (€5.26) 
HEC       €6.44 (€8.02)       €6.48 (€5.81)     €8.24 (€7.58) 
 




Table 3. Percentage of Subjects Giving Specified Proportions Reported in the Studies by Bohnet 
and Frey (1999), , Eckel and Grossman (1996) and Frey and Bohnet (1995) and in theThree 
Treatments (Anonymous, Two-way and Red Cross) in this Paper. 
(Figures in this Study Pooled over All Three Subject Groups, Alzheimer (AD), Mild Cognitive 





























No  offer  28% 0%  27% 1%  0%  0% 
Equal 
division 
25% 71% 17% 45% 48% 22% 
More than 
half  
0%  11% 15% 41% 40% 71% 
Mean  offer  26% 50% 31% 64% 64% 82% 
 
 





Figure 1a. Relative frequencies of offers of a specific amount out of 10 Euros 
in the anonymous treatment, shown according to subject group: patients with 
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Figure 1b. Relative frequencies of offers of a specific amount out of 10 Euros 
in the two way identification treatment, shown according to subject group: 
patients with Alzheimer (AD), mild cognitive impairment (MCI), healthy 





















Figure 1c. Relative frequencies of offers of a specific amount out of 10 Euros 
in the Red Cross treatment, shown according to subject group: patients with 
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 Appendix 1: Instructions 
 
The following instructions were read aloud. The participants did not receive a written version as 




Good morning. Thank you for participating in the exercise. 
 
In this exercise, each person will be paired with another located in another room. You don’t 
know this person and he or she doesn’t know who you are either. In addition, you will not meet 
each other. 
We will now give each of you 10 Euros and an envelope. You have to decide how much out of 
these 10 Euros you would like to give to the person you don’t know and how much you want to 
keep for yourself. 
Put the Euros you want to give to the other person (if any) inside the envelope. Keep the 
remaining Euros for yourself anywhere you want. 
What you do is secret. Nobody will know your decision. For this reason, you are seated behind 
cardboard screens. 
 
There is no hurry. You have five minutes to decide. 
Are there any questions? 
 





This part will be carried out separately after the previous experiment has finished. The persons 
who enter the room will be dressed conventionally, will be of the same sex as the patient, and 




In the following exercise, each of you will be paired with a person who will enter the room for a 
moment so that you can see him or her. (These persons enter and position themselves close to 
their paired subject’s chair. The experimenter says “this is the person with whom you are 
matched” and invites the subjects to look at each other. After a few seconds, the experimenter 
says “thank you” and “you can go now", and the persons depart).  
 
We will now give you ten Euros and an envelope. You have to decide how much out of these 10 
Euros you would like to give to the person you just saw and how much you want to keep for 
yourself. 
Put the Euros you want to give to the other person (if any) inside the envelope. Keep the 
remaining Euros for yourself anywhere you want. 
What you do is secret. Nobody will know your decision. For this reason, you are seated behind 
cardboard screens. 
 
There is no hurry. You have five minutes to decide. 
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We will now give you an envelope and ten Euros to be shared with the Red Cross. You have to 
decide how much out of these 10 Euros you want to keep for yourself and how much you want to 
give to the Red Cross. 
Put the Euros you want to give to the Red Cross (if any) inside the envelope. Keep the remaining 
Euros for yourself anywhere you want. 
What you do is secret. Nobody will know your decision. For this reason, you are seated behind 
cardboard screens. 
 
There is no hurry. You have five minutes to decide. 
Are there any questions? 
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Appendix 2: Raw patient data.  
 













 CODE    GENDER 
F=female, 
     JOB 
TYPE* 
Labor activity 
   
Sept. 
data 
MCI I  A1  MCI   F  69  Basic reading and 
writing 
  Housewife  6      5  10 
  9:00  A2 MCI    M  73  Elementary  E  Baker  10 8  10 
 
  A4  MCI   M  78  Can read and write  E  Building 
worker 
5 5  10 
 
MCI II  A5  MCI   M  66  High school  E  Quality control 
at nuclear 
power plants 
5 5  10 
 
9:45  A6  MCII  later 
diagnosed 
with AD 
F  72  Basic reading and 
writing 
  Housewife 5  5  5 
    A7  MCI   F  68  Can read and write  E  Cleaner  5  5  10 
 
  A8 MCI    M  68  Elementary  E  Unskilled 
worker, shoe 
making 
5 5  10 





B1 Control  F  60  Elementary    Housewife 10  10  10 
Family 
A6 
10:30  B2  Control  M  79  Can read and write  E  Farmer  5  5  5 
Family 
C1 
  B3  Control  F  77  Can read and write    Housewife 5  5  10 
Family 
A7 
  B4  Control  M  69  Can read and write  E  Unskilled 
factory worker 
5 5  10 
Family 
A8  
  B5  Control  F  67  Can read and write    Housewife 5  10  10 
Family 
C2 
  B6 Control  M  81  High  school  E  Accountant 10  10  10 
Family 
C3 
  B7  Control  F  69  High school  SE  Small shop 
owner 
5 5 5 
    B8  Control  M  79  Can read and write  SE  Fisherman  7  7  7 
  AD I  C1  AD  M  80  Can read and write  E  Porter   10  10  10 
  11:15  C2 AD  F  79  Elementary    Housewife 10  10  10 
 
AD II  C3 AD  M  71  Elementary  SE  Small  shop 
owner 
5 10  10 
  12:00  C4  AD  F  79  Can read and write    Housewife 4  3  6 
  AD IV  C7 AD  F  81  Illiterate    Housewife 5  6  5 
  13:30  C8 AD  M  85  Elementary  SE  Porter  10  10  10 
January 
data 
9:30  1.1  MCI  F  73  Basic reading and 
writing 
E Cleaner  10  10  10 
 
  1.2  MCI  M  72  Can read and write  E  Building 
worker 
4 5 5 
   1.3  AD  M  71  Elementary  E  Porter  8  9  10 
Family 
1.3 
10:00  2.1  Control  F  69  Can read and write  E  Tailor  10  10  10 
Family 
1.2 
  2.2  Control  F  72  Illiterate  E  Farm worker  10  8  12 
   2.3  Control  M  65  Elementary  E  Lorry driver  7  8  5 




10:30  3.1  Control  F  80  Can read and write  SE  Fishing 
entrepreneur 
(2) 
3  4  4 
Worker’s 
Relative 
  3.2  Control  F  77  Can read and write  SE  Food shop 
owner 
10  10  10 
    3.3  Control  F  67  Elementary  E  Cleaner  4  4  5 
 
  3.4  Control  M  64  Elementary  E  Garage 
manager 
2  2  2 
 




0  5  10 
 
11:00  4.1 MCI  later 
AD 
F  81  Can read and write  E  Cleaner  5  4  5 
 
 4.2  MCI  later 
AD 
M 78  Elementary  E  Sound 
technician 
RNE 
10 10 10 
 
 4.3  MCI  M  70  Illiterate  E  Building 
worker 
10 10 10 
 
 4.4  MCI  later 
AD 
M 78  High  school  E  Building 
worker 
4 4 5 
 
11:30  5.2  AD  F  72  Elementary  E  Seller of  
ONCE 
coupons 
5 5  10 
 
 5.3  AD  F  59  Elementary  SE  Self-employed 
cleaner 
10 10 10 
 




   
    5.5  AD  F  74  Can read and write  E  Dressmaker  8  7  7 
  12:00  6.1 MCI  M  89  Elementary  E Docker  5  5 5 
 
  6.2  MCI  F  70  Can read and write  SE  Self-employed 
dressmaker 
6 5 7 
    6.3  MCI  M  70  Can read and write  E  Miner  5  5  10 
   6.4  MCI  F  79  Elementary  SE  Painter  10  10  10 
Family 
8.3 
12:30  7.1  Control  M  70  Elementary  E  Hospital 
attendant 
10  10  10 
Family 
8.2 
  7.2  Control  F  65  Elementary  E  Bus company 
worker 
5  5  10 
Family 
8.1 
  7.3  Control  F  73  Elementary  E  Nurse 
assistant 
5  5  5 
Family 
8.1 




5  5  5 
Family 
8.4 
  7.5  Control  M  79  Elementary  E  Railway 
worker 








5 5 5 
  13:00  8.1 AD  F  80  High  school  E  Nurse  5 5  10 
   8.2  AD  M  71  Elementary  E  Accountant 10  10  10 
 
 8.3  AD  F  69  Elementary  E  Nurse 
assistant 
6 6 9 
    8.4  AD  F  78  Can read and write  E  Tailor  5  5  6 
 




5 5  10 
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 9.2  MCI  M  83  Elementary  SE  Self-employed 
cobbler 
5 5 6 
 
  9.3  MCI  F  77  Can read and write  E  Kitchen 
assistant 
10 10 10 
    9.4  MCI  M  79  Can read and write  E  Farm worker  5  5  4 
    9.5  MCI  M  73  Can read and write  E  Lorry driver  4  4  5 
 
17:30  10.1  Control  F  67  Can read and write  SE  Self-employed 
embroiderer 
5  5  10 
 
  10.2  Control  F  60  Can read and write  SE  Catering – 
hotel business 
entrepreneur 
5  5  10 
 




10  5  10 
    10.5  Control  M  72  High school  SE  Decorator  5  5  10 
 
18:00  11.1 AD  M  77  Elementary  E Wooden  floor 
installer 
8 8  12 
 




5 5 7 
 
 11.3  AD  M  76  Elementary  SE  Garage 
entrepreneur 
(3 employees) 
2 2 8 
 
  11.4  AD  F  74  Can read and write  SE  Self-employed 
cleaner 
5 5 5 
*Self-employed (SE), Employed (E). Three Subject Groups: patients with 
Alzheimer (AD), mild cognitive impairment (MCI), healthy elderly controls 
(HEC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 